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Randstorm Checker

In 2011–2015, BitcoinJS-based wallet sites (bitaddress.org-era generators, early blockchain.info) created keys with a SecureRandom pool seeded by only a few Math.random() draws and a timestamp — effectively ~32 bits of entropy (the Randstorm class of bugs). This tool models that collapse: a single 32-bit seed is stretched into the 256-byte pool, run through the RC4-style key schedule BitcoinJS used, and turned into a secp256k1 key. Verify a seed to see its key and addresses, or scan a seed range to recover the private key behind a target address on the selected chain. Every hit is verified by regenerating the address. Everything runs in your browser.

bitcoin
Brute-forces the 32-bit seed range below (both compressed / uncompressed P2PKH variants) and recovers the private key if the address was generated under the modeled Randstorm collapse.
to the full Randstorm space is 0–232−1 (a GPU job); this browser demo scans a bounded slice — try 0–65535 first
derives the key + addresses for one seed (instant)
Scope: this models the class of failure behind Randstorm — entropy collapsed to a single 32-bit seed that determines the whole SecureRandom pool — not a byte-exact reproduction of a specific 2011–2015 BitcoinJS build, so it will not recover keys from real historical wallets without the exact wallet-creation parameters. It recovers any key generated under this model and demonstrates why a weak RNG is catastrophic. 
Instructions:
1. Verify a seed — type a 32-bit seed (e.g. 1337) and press "Verify seed" to derive its SecureRandom pool, secp256k1 key, WIF, and both P2PKH addresses instantly.
2. Scan a range — paste a Bitcoin P2PKH address (starts with 1…), set a seed range, and press "Scan range". The private key is recovered if the address was generated under the modeled Randstorm collapse.
3. A key is shown only when it regenerates the target address, so a match is verified, not guessed. Both compressed and uncompressed address variants are tried.
4. The full 2011–2015 Randstorm space is ~2^32 seeds — too large for a browser in one go; scan bounded slices (0–65535 first) and widen as needed.
5. No internet needed — all secp256k1 and hashing runs in your browser.
Educational tool — models a vulnerability class. This reproduces the effect of the Randstorm bugs (weak BitcoinJS SecureRandom seeding in 2011–2015): a private key determined by a small 32-bit seed, exhaustively brute-forcible. It is not a byte-exact reproduction of a specific vulnerable BitcoinJS build, so it will not recover keys from real historical wallets without the exact wallet-creation parameters — it recovers any key generated under this model and shows why a weak RNG is catastrophic. Every recovered key is verified by regenerating the address; nothing is guessed. Never enter keys for wallets you use.